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Recent research into cultural transmission suggests that humans are disposed to learn, 42 
remember, and transmit certain types of information more easily than others, and that any 43 
information that is passed between people will be subjected to cognitive selective pressures 44 
which alter the content and structure so as to make it maximally transmittable. This paper 45 
presents a review of emerging research on content biases in cultural evolution with relevance 46 
to the transmission of popular narratives. This is illustrated with content analysis of urban 47 
legends, which found that most featured at least one known content bias, with emotional 48 
information and social information being the most frequent. Most legends contained two to 49 
three biases, suggesting an optimum number of biases to be combined for a transmission 50 
advantage. We argue that the narratives do not succeed due to the transmission of adaptively-51 













Cultural transmission has played a vital role in shaping the evolution of human cognition. In 63 
the seven million years or so since our lineage diverged from the other great apes, our 64 
ancestors evolved a range of specialised psychological adaptations that supported the 65 
efficient acquisition and communication of information via social learning. They include 66 
“true imitation” (the ability to copy actions and intentions), language, and a variety of 67 
cognitive biases that guide our decisions on who and what to copy (e.g. Mesoudi 2011). 68 
While these biases have been favoured by natural selection because they enable adaptive 69 
behaviours to spread within populations far more easily than they could through individual 70 
trial-and-error or blind copying, they can nevertheless make us susceptible to adopting ideas 71 
and practices that may serve no useful purpose, or which may even be maladaptive from a 72 
genetic point of view. Extreme examples of the latter include religious ideologies of celibacy, 73 
blood-letting (Milton, Claidière & Mercier, 2015) and even suicide epidemics (Mesoudi, 74 
2009). In this paper we review how emerging findings into cognitive and cultural evolution 75 
can help to shed light on the characteristics of a universal and pervasive form of cultural 76 
transmission – storytelling. We argue that the successful transmission of stories does not 77 
depend so much on them containing adaptively-relevant information (e.g. Gottschall, 2012; 78 
Zipes, 2006), but on their ability to exploit adaptive learning heuristics favouring certain 79 
types of content (“content biases”). We then illustrate the importance of this distinction 80 
through a content analysis of popular urban legends. 81 
 82 




Recent research into cultural transmission suggests that humans are disposed to learn, 85 
remember, and transmit certain types of information more easily than others, and that any 86 
information that is passed between people will be subjected to cognitive selective pressures 87 
which alter the content and structure so as to make it maximally transmittable (Barrett & 88 
Nyhof, 2001). Here we focus on five of these "content biases" (Mesoudi 2011) or "factors of 89 
attraction" (Morin, 2015; Sperber, 1996) that are particularly relevant to the transmission 90 
success of narratives: ecological survival information bias (Nairne, 2010), social information 91 
bias (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006); emotional bias (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001),  92 
minimally counter-intuitive (MCI) bias (Boyer & Ramble, 2001), and  stereotype consistency 93 
bias (Kashima, 2000).  94 
 95 
Ecological Survival Information Bias 96 
 97 
Nairne and colleagues (Nairne 2010; Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007; Nairne & 98 
Pandeirada, 2008) argue that, as evolved trait, human memory must have been shaped by 99 
selection pressures to achieve specific fitness-related goals. Human memory, they argue, has 100 
evolved to encode and recall fitness related information better than other forms of 101 
information. To test this, Nairne, Thompson, and Pandeirada (2007) proposed the ‘survival 102 
processing’ paradigm, where participants imagine themselves stranded in a foreign grassland 103 
scenario and then rate the relevance of words to their survival. A number of studies, using a 104 
variety of experimental designs and materials (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne et al., 105 
2007; Kang et al., 2008; Otgaar, Smeets, & van Bergen, 2010; Weinstein, Bugg, & Roediger, 106 
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2008) have demonstrated the strong mnemonic advantage that survival processing grants 107 
participants over other forms of processing and that this effect is robust within and between 108 
participants. The recall advantage for ecological survival information found in these studies 109 
suggests a potential bias for ecological information relevant to survival in human cultural 110 
transmission. Beyond individual recall, Stubbersfield, Tehrani and Flynn (2015) found an 111 
advantage for urban legends featuring survival information over control material in a 112 
cumulative recall chain experiment.  113 
Traditional folklore from various cultures provides examples of narratives which 114 
contain ecological information relevant to survival. Sugiyama (2001) argues that oral 115 
narratives among foraging peoples are used as a means to transmit this survival relevant 116 
information. Since these folktales are likely to have been passed down over many 117 
generations, the presence of this content supports the results of the experimental studies 118 
suggesting that ecological survival information is likely to be transmitted with a high degree 119 
of fidelity.  120 
 121 
Social Information Bias 122 
 123 
The Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Whiten, 1999) or Social Brain 124 
(Dunbar, 1998; 2003) hypothesis suggests that primates evolved greater intelligence in order 125 
to deal with complex social interactions, rather than to deal with non-social challenges in 126 
their ecological environment. As such, Mesoudi, Whiten and Dunbar (2006) argue that 127 
humans should preferentially attend to, recall, and transmit social information over equivalent 128 
non-social information and found support for this hypothesis in a transmission chain study 129 
7 
 
which  demonstrated that social information was transmitted with greater accuracy and in 130 
greater quantity than equivalent non-social information. This result is supported by 131 
Stubbersfield et al (2015), who found that urban legends featuring social information were 132 
transmitted with greater fidelity than control material and urban legends featuring survival 133 
information. Social information bias is also supported by evidence from traditional folktales, 134 
which, as Sugiyama (2001) points out, frequently concern topics such as kinship, marriage, 135 
sex, friendship, betrayal, social status, interpersonal conflict and deception.  136 
 137 
Emotional Bias 138 
 139 
Emotional arousal is known to be an important factor in the storage and recall of memories 140 
(LaBar & Cabeza, 2006), and is thought to play a major role in the transmission of cultural 141 
knowledge and beliefs (Whitehouse, 2004). Heath, Bell, and Sternberg (2001) found that 142 
participants preferred and were more likely to pass on urban legends which produce high 143 
levels of disgust and that urban legends which featured a greater number of disgust evoking 144 
motifs were more widely distributed on urban legend websites. Eriksson and Coultas (2014) 145 
expanded on Heath et al. (2001) and demonstrated a bias for urban legends which evoked 146 
higher levels of disgust across three phases of cultural transmission: ‘choose-to-receive’, 147 
‘encode-and-retrieve’ and ‘choose-to-transmit’. Outside of disgust, Stubbersfield, Tehrani 148 
and Flynn (in press) found a more general advantage for more emotive urban legends. In an 149 
analysis of New York Times articles, Berger and Milkman (2010), found that those articles 150 
which aroused emotions characterized by high arousal, such as anger, were more likely to be 151 
transmitted than articles which aroused emotions characterized by low arousal, such as 152 
sadness. More recent research by Eriksson, Coultas and de Barra (2016) has suggested that 153 
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emotional bias may vary cross-culturally, as they found that, while American participants 154 
displayed a bias towards disgusting content, Indian participants did not. Both groups showed 155 
a bias towards more amusing stories, however.  156 
 157 
Minimally Counter-Intuitive (MCI) Bias 158 
 159 
Boyer (1994) has argued that humans hold intuitive assumptions about the properties of 160 
different categories of entities. These intuitive assumptions are generally described as ‘folk 161 
biology’, ‘folk physics’, and ‘folk psychology’. Concepts which violate these category-level 162 
expectations are considered to be counterintuitive and, when balanced against a majority of 163 
intuitive elements (hence minimally counter intuitive), feature inherent transmission 164 
advantages that can increase the salience of a narrative (Boyer, 1994). Several studies have 165 
shown that MCI narratives have an advantage in recall and transmission (Barrett & Nyhof, 166 
2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Upal 2011) and some suggest a cognitively optimum number 167 
of counterintuitive elements (1-2 for Barrett, Burdett and Porter, 2009; 2-3 for Norenzayan, 168 
Atran, Faulkner & Schaller, 2006). Studies also show, however, that simply adding counter-169 
intuitive concepts to a narrative is unlikely to enhance its transmission. Upal (2011) argues 170 
that the cohesion of the narrative is a key mediating factor in its memorability and calls into 171 
question the idea that there is a specific cognitive optimum for all narratives. Stubbersfield 172 
and Tehrani (2013) used computational phylogenetic methods to examine MCI in the 173 
evolution of the urban legend ‘Bloody Mary’, and found that intuitive concepts were found to 174 
be equally stable in transmission, suggesting that MCI bias functions on the narrative as a 175 




Stereotype Consistency Bias 178 
 179 
Cultural stereotypes are social representations about social groups which are likely to arise 180 
from the cognitive processes of sense-making and conventionalisation (Bangerter, 2000; 181 
Kashima, 2000). It has been suggested by a number of researchers that information which 182 
conforms to stereotypical assumptions is more likely to be transmitted than information that 183 
conflicts with them. Fyock and Stangor’s (1994) meta-analysis found that people recalled 184 
stereotype-consistent (SC) information better than stereotype-inconsistent (SI) information, 185 
when presented with both. More recently support for bias SC content in transmission has 186 
been demonstrated experimentally by Kashima (2000) and Bangerter (2000), although 187 
Kashima (2000) did find an advantage for SI content in the earlier positions of a transmission 188 
chain, perhaps suggesting an advantage for SI content in induvial recall. Importantly 189 
however, the extent to which people hold these stereotypes as true affects the degree of bias 190 
in transmission, as does an in-group out-group effect; participants are more likely to view an 191 
out-group’s behaviour as homogenous compared to the behaviour of their in-group (Kashima, 192 
2000). Interestingly, Lyons and Kashima (2006) found that SC content was preferentially 193 
retained only where participants had communicative intent (i.e. they were aware that material 194 
was being passed on to another participant); chains which only featured cumulative recall 195 
showed no SC bias. This suggests that some content biases might influence the selection of 196 
information for transmission, rather than its encoding and recall. 197 
 198 




The research summarized above suggests there are a number of cognitive dispositions that 201 
probably favour the transmission of certain types of story content, and may make us 202 
susceptible to apocryphal and potentially even harmful narratives. With that in mind, we turn 203 
now to an empirical study in which we investigated whether there is any evidence for these 204 
biases in a popular and well-documented genre of contemporary storytelling: urban legends. 205 
Urban legends are apocryphal stories that are told as true (Brunvand, 2000; Tangherlini, 206 
1990), involve a contemporary setting (Brunvand, 2000), and feature a single event as the 207 
core of the narrative (Tangherlini, 1990). Historically, these legends have been transmitted 208 
through word-of-mouth but more recently their transmission has been accelerated by through 209 
electronic media (Brunvand, 2000; Fox Tree & Weldon 2007). Popular urban legends can be 210 
widespread and influence individual behaviour (see Best & Horiuchi, 1985 for parents’ 211 
reactions to the ‘razor blade in apple’ legend), negatively impact on businesses (‘Chinese 212 
restaurant bankruptcy fear’, 2011) and inspire horror movies such as Candyman (Rose, 213 
Barker & Golin, 1992) and Urban Legend (Blanks, Mattews, McDonnell, & Monitz, 1998). 214 
Given that most urban legends are not based on true events (and are often easy to disprove), 215 
their popularity cannot be explained in simple utilitarian terms, however, following the 216 
research reviewed above, we can hypothesise that their success may be due to their ability to 217 








Two-hundred and sixty urban legends were collected from the Urban Legends Reference 224 
Pages (www.snopes.com) using the ‘randomizer’ function which provides a random selection 225 
of one legend from their database of thousands. The Urban Legends Reference Pages is the 226 
most complete collection of urban legends available and has been praised by folklorists 227 
knowledgeable in the field such as Brunvand (Seipp, 2004). It has also been used as a source 228 
for material in other studies examining biases in cultural evolution (see Fessler, Pisor, & 229 
Navarrete, 2014). For the purposes of this study urban legends were defined as apocryphal 230 
narratives, told as true, involving a contemporary setting and featuring or referencing a single 231 
event as the core of their narrative. As the Urban Legends Reference Pages applies a more 232 
expansive use of the term ‘urban legend’ than is used here, also including rumours, trivia, 233 
hoaxes, common misconceptions and misinformation, only legends which met the above 234 
criteria were used in analysis. To meet the criteria of being an ‘apocryphal narrative’ only 235 
those legends which have been rated by the Urban Legends Reference Pages as ‘False’ or 236 
‘Legend’ were used (complete details on the Urban Legends Reference Pages rating system 237 
can be found at http://www.snopes.com/info/ratings.asp). Two-hundred and sixty legends 238 
were originally collected as it was felt that this number was large enough to provide a 239 
representative sample with potentially all biases being represented. During analysis six of 240 
these were rejected for not matching the criteria for an urban legend described above, leaving 241 
254 legends in the final sample. When multiple variants of a legend were presented, only the 242 






The collected legends were coded for the presence of biases using NVivo 10 (QSR 247 
International, 2012). These biases included emotional content (subdivided into anger, 248 
amusement, disgust, and fear), MCI content, social content (subdivided into social, social 249 
context, and social gossip), stereotype consistency (subdivided into male behaviour, female 250 
behaviour, race/nationality, and regional), and survival information (subdivided into high and 251 
low). See Table 1 for the coded biases and the definitions used. 252 
The emotions coded were anger, disgust, fear, and amusement. The first three of these 253 
emotions are taken directly from Ekman’s (1992) list of Basic Emotions. Of the six Basic 254 
Emotions sadness was not coded due to research suggesting it does not enhance transmission 255 
(Berger & Milkman, 2009) and surprise was not coded due to its neutral valence. Amusement 256 
(also referred to as mirth, exhilaration [McGhee, 1979; Ruch, 1993] or joy [Panksepp & 257 
Burgdorf, 2003]), was chosen for coding in place of happiness for a number of reasons. First, 258 
it was thought that material deliberately intending to elicit amusement would be easier for 259 
coders to recognize than happiness. Second, as in the other emotions coded, amusement is 260 
thought to have an adaptive function (Gervais & Wilson, 2005). Third, Ekman (1999) 261 
suggests that amusement shares characteristics with the six Basic Emotions and included it in 262 
an expanded list. All four of the emotions coded are characterized by high-arousal, are cross-263 
culturally recognized and have been included in studies examining emotion in transmission 264 
(Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Meagher, Arnau & Rhudy, 2001; Ruch, 1993; Russell & 265 
Mehrabian, 1974).  266 
To assess inter-rater reliability an independent coder, blind to the hypothesis, coded a 267 
sample of 50 randomly selected legends. They were provided with the coding definitions (see 268 
Table 1) and instructed to code as present any biases that they believed were featured in the 269 
legends. The coding of the second coder and the researcher was highly consistent, being in 270 









The majority of urban legends coded were shown to feature content which exploits cognitive 278 
biases. Examples of legends can be found in the supplementary material (SM).  Biases for 279 
emotional content, MCI, social information, ecological survival information and stereotype 280 
consistency were all represented, with 92% of legends featuring at least one bias (see Table 2 281 
for frequency of biases coded and Table S1 in SM for the frequency of specific biases).  282 
 283 
[Table 2 about here] 284 
 285 
Emotional Bias 286 
 287 
One of the two biases most frequently coded as present was emotional content (present in 288 
78% of the legends). The bias was subdivided into four emotions, three which are 289 
characterised by negative valence and high arousal: anger, disgust and fear (Russell & 290 
Mehrabian, 1974; Meagher et al., 2001), and one which is characterised by positive valence 291 
and high arousal: amusement (Ruch, 1993). Of these, amusement was the most frequent (47% 292 
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of legends). Fear and disgust occurred at a frequency of 14% and 13% respectively. Anger 293 
was the least frequent (4% of legends).  294 
 295 
Social Information Bias 296 
 297 
Social information was one of the two most frequently coded biases (77% of legends). Social 298 
information was subdivided into three levels: social context, social and social gossip (see 299 
Table 1 for definitions). Of these levels, social was the most frequently coded (49% of 300 
legends). 18% of legends contained social context and 9% contained social gossip.  301 
 302 
Ecological Survival Information Bias 303 
 304 
Ecological survival information was present in 27% of legends. This bias was subdivided into 305 
two levels: high, concerning serious injury or death, and low, concerning injury or potential 306 
injury. Of these levels high survival information was the most frequently coded (20% of 307 
legends), low survival information was present in 7% of legends. 308 
 309 
Stereotype Consistency Bias 310 
 311 
Stereotype consistent behaviour was present in 23% of the legends. Stereotypical behaviour 312 
based on race or nationality was the most frequent (9%). Other stereotypes included gender 313 
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stereotypes (7% stereotypical male behaviour, 5% stereotypical female behaviour). Only 2% 314 
contained stereotypical behaviour based on region. No legends were coded as featuring 315 
stereotype inconsistent behaviour.  316 
 317 
Minimally Counterintuitive (MCI) Bias 318 
 319 
MCI was the least frequently coded bias (6% of legends). Each MCI legend was coded for 320 
the number of counterintuitive objects or concepts. The number of counterintuitive features 321 
present ranged from 1-2. 93% of the MCI legends featured just one MCI object or concept. 322 
 323 
Multiple Biases 324 
 325 
76% of the legends featured two or more biases, with the majority of legends featuring two 326 
(see Figure 1).  327 
 328 
[Figure 1 around here] 329 
 330 
There were a number of common combinations (see Tables 3 and S1 for the frequency of 331 




[Table 3 around here] 334 
 335 
Amusement and Social Information were found together in 31% of the legends, Survival 336 
(High) and Fear were found together in 11% of the legends and Survival (High) and Disgust 337 
were found in 5% of the legends. All legends featuring stereotype consistent content, also 338 
featured social information and amusement, below is an example of one such legend: 339 
 340 
Stereotype-Social-Amusement Legend Example 341 
A few Decembers ago Japanese department store, desperate to appear westernised 342 
and with-it, mounted an extravagant Christmas display, featuring a life-sized Santa 343 
Claus, crucified upon a cross. 344 
 345 
An abridged example of a legend featuring ecological survival information and fear content is 346 
below: 347 
 348 
 Survival-Fear Legend 349 
Don’t forget to look !!! This is really scary ...the mystery behind a recent spate of 350 
deaths has been solved…3 women in Chicago, turned up at hospitals over a 5 day 351 
period, all with the same symptoms. Fever, chills, and vomiting, followed by muscular 352 
collapse, paralysis, and finally, death… It was discovered, however, that they had all 353 
visited the same restaurant……one toxicologist… drove out to the restaurant, went 354 
into the restroom, and lifted the toilet seat. Under the seat, out of normal view, was 355 
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small spider……So please, before you use a public toilet, lift the seat to check for 356 
spiders. 357 
It can save your life!... 358 
 359 
The example below featured survival information and disgusting content: 360 
 361 
 Survival-Disgust Legend 362 
An old lady ordered out for Kentucky Fried Chicken. She was eating along when she 363 
noticed teeth; she pulled back the crust and discovered she was eating a rat. She had 364 
a heart attack and died, and her relatives sued Kentucky Fried Chicken for a lot of 365 
money. 366 
 367 
No Biases 368 
 369 




This study set out to investigate the role of content biases in the transmission of urban 374 
legends. The results provide compelling evidence that the content and popularity of urban 375 
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legends has been influenced by cognitive biases. Over 90% of the legends included in this 376 
analysis contained at least one bias. This is consistent with experimental studies 377 
demonstrating superior recall and fidelity of transmission of information that exploit biases. 378 
They are also in line with studies of traditional folklore suggesting that successful tales and 379 
myths frequently reflect these biases (Barrett, Burdett, & Porter, 2009; Norenzayan et al., 380 
2006; Sugiyama, 2001). 381 
Only a small minority of legends were coded as featuring no biases. One possible 382 
explanation of this relates to the individual version of a legend which was coded. Any legend, 383 
urban or traditional, is likely to exist in multiple versions due to the infidelity of cultural 384 
transmission. These versions will vary in content to some degree and some will be more 385 
culturally successful than others. It is likely that when looking at multiple versions of the one 386 
legend more versions would exploit at least one bias than none. 387 
 388 
 389 
Are some biases more important in transmission than others? 390 
 391 
Content which would exploit emotional bias was one of the most frequently coded biases 392 
(78%), being found in the majority of legends, with all of the emotions coded characterised 393 
by high arousal. This provides good evidence for an emotional content bias in the 394 
transmission of narrative. This bias was rarely found on its own (3% of the legends were 395 
coded as only featuring emotional bias) suggesting that high emotional content grants a 396 
transmission advantage to a narrative but this is mostly in addition to another content bias. 397 
The most frequently coded emotion bias was amusement, being coded as present more 398 
frequently than both disgust and fear put together. The results suggest that ‘funny stories’ 399 
(Example 1) are found more frequently than ‘disgusting stories’ (Example 8) or ‘scary 400 
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stories’ (Example 7). This is consistent with previous research examining emotional bias in 401 
transmission has found a potential cross-cultural advantage for amusing content (Eriksson, 402 
Coultas & de Barra, 2016) but is perhaps counter to the common conception of urban 403 
legends. Based on these results it is feasible that positively valenced narratives may feature a 404 
transmission advantage over negatively valenced narratives, however, this is not definitive 405 
and further research examining emotional bias is required to establish if and how it varies 406 
between emotions evoked and what effect this has on transmission.  407 
Over three quarters of urban legends coded contained social information, a finding 408 
consistent with experimental studies (Mesoudi, Whiten & Dunbar, 2006; Stubbersfield, 409 
Tehrani & Flynn, 2015). This is a far greater than the number of legends containing 410 
ecological survival information. Social information bias was the bias most frequently coded 411 
as the sole bias in a narrative (9% of the legends were coded as only featuring social bias), 412 
suggesting that a social information bias provides enough of an advantage alone for some 413 
transmission success. Celebrities (such as Elvis and Priscilla Presley) were sometimes 414 
featured in legends containing social information, perhaps because they represent people that 415 
a large number of people are familiar with and therefore provide relevant social information 416 
to a wide audience.  417 
One of the more unexpected results of Mesoudi, Whiten and Dunbar (2006) was that 418 
social non-gossip was transmitted just as well as gossip, suggesting that the intensity of social 419 
relationships described in the information has no effect on the fidelity of transmission but 420 
what is important is some form of third party interaction. A similar result was found in the 421 
current study as the social sub-category (which featured the same definition as Mesoudi et 422 
al.’s social non-gossip) was coded as present more frequently than the social gossip sub-423 
category. This result is consistent with the expectation that gossip would not be more 424 
frequent than social non-gossip. In general, these results are consistent with the predictions 425 
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based on the Machiavellian Intelligence or Social Brain hypotheses and suggest that humans 426 
are highly susceptible to narratives featuring social information content. 427 
Over a quarter of legends were coded as featuring ecological survival information. 428 
This provides support for a survival information bias (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne et 429 
al., 2007; Kang et al., 2008; Otgaar et al., 2010; Weinstein et al., 2008) and is consistent with 430 
the oral narratives of foraging peoples (Sugiyama, 2001).The consistency with the latter is 431 
noteworthy, given the radical differences in the contexts of transmission. One might expect 432 
ecological information to be less salient to post-industrial populations than to foragers, who 433 
depend on detailed knowledge of their environments to survive. However, the popularity of 434 
urban legends concerned with health risks and environmental hazards, such as food 435 
contamination (e.g. the ‘Kentucky fried rat’ example) suggests that ecological survival bias 436 
still plays an important role in the spread and persistence of narratives in the developed 437 
world. In most cases, it seems unlikely that the legends actually contain useful survival-438 
relevant information, however, legends such as the ‘razor blade in the apple’ did affect 439 
behaviour on a wide scale despite its false premises (see Best & Horiuchi, 1985). The 440 
successful transmission of a legend would appear to be based more on our susceptibility to 441 
information about survival, rather than the usefulness of the information itself.  442 
Of the legends coded, 23% featured behaviour consistent with cultural stereotypes of 443 
race, nationality, gender and region but none were coded as featuring stereotype inconsistent 444 
behaviour. This is generally consistent with the literature; Fyock and Stangor (1994) and 445 
Clark and Kashima (2007) suggest that SC content has a transmission advantage. The nature 446 
of stereotype consistent information means that it was never seen in isolation as a bias and 447 
has a strong association with social information and the emotion amusement. They were 448 
almost consistently ‘funny stories’ with the amusement being found in cultural stereotypes. 449 
Future research needs to examine whether the transmission advantage provided by stereotype 450 
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consistent content is actually due to the advantage provided by social information and if these 451 
two biases can be separated.  452 
MCI was the least frequent bias, as only 6% of the legends were coded as containing 453 
this bias. This was unexpected as traditional folklore and myth commonly features MCI 454 
content (Barrett, Burdett, & Porter, 2009; Norenzayan et al., 2006).The number of 455 
counterintuitive characters found in each legend is consistent with the cognitive optimum of 456 
1-2 suggested by Barrett, Burdett and Porter (2009), however, with the majority (93%) only 457 
featuring one counterintuitive character they generally fall below the cognitive optimum of 2-458 
3 suggested by Norenzayan et al. (2006). Where MCI content is featured it is generally in 459 
reference to a ghost. References to other MCI characters which are found in traditional 460 
folklore, such as talking animals, are apparently non-existent in urban legends. The low 461 
frequency of legends containing MCI information could be explained by genre categorisation. 462 
Contemporary folklore which features MCI content is usually categorised as ‘ghost stories’ or 463 
cryptozoology and UFO tales rather than urban legends. Another possible explanation could 464 
be the relative ages of traditional folklore and urban legends, it is feasible that the MCI urban 465 
legends will survive transmission for many years longer than the non-MCI urban legends. 466 
 467 
 468 
Do content biases tend to occur individually or in combination with other biases?  469 
 470 
The majority of legends were coded as featuring more than one bias (see Figure 1), 471 
suggesting that exploiting multiple biases provides a greater transmission advantage to a 472 
narrative. In the majority of legends, however, a combination of two biases was the highest 473 
number featured, suggesting an optimum number of biases to be combined for a transmission 474 
advantage. One possible explanation for this is that biases are exploited by content and that 475 
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with more biases there would be more content which could make the narrative overly 476 
complex and unmemorable. Another possible explanation is that different biases may conflict 477 
with each other, making the narrative nonsensical or unappealing. As Upal (2011) has 478 
suggested, with counterintuitive characters in a narrative, the legend must remain coherent to 479 
be memorable so there is likely to be a limit to the amount of biased content which can be 480 
included before the narrative loses coherence. Multiple biases appearing together is also seen 481 
in model-based biases (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013). In this case children have been shown 482 
to calibrate across multiple model-based biases and certain biases will dominate over others. 483 
Content biases could function in a similar way, with certain biases granting a greater 484 
transmission advantage than others. As yet research into content biases has focused on 485 
individual biases, however, Stubbersfield et al (2015) found that stories which combined 486 
survival and social information had a transmission advantage over those solely featuring 487 
survival information but were transmitted with equal fidelity to those featuring solely social 488 
information. Seeing which biases are combined and the frequency of their combination with 489 
other biases could suggest the relative strength of a bias in transmission.  490 
Social information was by far the most frequent single bias, suggesting it provides 491 
enough of a transmission advantage in itself, a finding consistent with Stubbersfield et al 492 
(2015). Other biases were also frequently combined with social information. The most 493 
frequent combinations suggest certain common ‘story types’ which are culturally successful. 494 
The most common ‘story type’ among the legends collected for this study was the ‘funny 495 
story’; these legends combined social information and amusement. Another ‘story type’ 496 
would be the ‘scary story’ or ‘warning’, combining survival information and fear and 497 
structured as a warning against certain behaviour. ‘Scary’ legends frequently emphasise the 498 
truth of the information and often urge the receiver to transmit the content. Another common 499 
‘story type’ that could be viewed as the stereotypical urban legend is the ‘disgusting story’ 500 
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which combines disgust and survival information. These different story types suggest that 501 
some biases may complement each other and generate a greater transmission advantage and 502 
therefore be frequently found together.  503 
Another question that arises from legends featuring multiple biases is: are the biases 504 
all contributing to a transmission advantage or is some biased content ‘riding’ on the 505 
transmission advantage of another? For example, the majority of survival information was 506 
coded as high survival (information relevant to serious injury or death) so feasibly the 507 
cultural success of urban legends which feature survival content owe their success to also 508 
exploiting emotional biases such as fear or disgust (77% of legends which were coded as 509 
featuring high survival information were also coded as evoking fear or disgust) rather than 510 
combining survival information and emotional content. The results of Stubbersfield et al 511 
(2015) discussed above suggest that the prevalence of threats and hazards found in urban 512 
legends may be due to their combination with social information bias or emotional bias, 513 
rather than a strong susceptibility to survival-related content per se. 514 
 515 
How universal are content biases? 516 
 517 
The assumption of content biases is that they exploit shared cognitive dispositions towards 518 
certain properties of cultural items. A criticism of this is that the majority of the research 519 
examining content biases has used participants from nations described by Henrich, Heine and 520 
Norenzayan (2010a) as western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic (WEIRD). 521 
People from WEIRD nations represent only 12% of the world’s population and could be 522 
considered psychologically unusual (Arnett, 2008; Henrich, Heine & Norenzaya, 2010b). As 523 
such the results of such studies may not be generalisable to humans as a whole. The urban 524 
legends presented here are collected from western, English-speaking countries and as such 525 
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may only reflect the content biases of people from WEIRD nations. There is evidence, 526 
however, to suggest that the same content biases are present in the folklore of non-WEIRD 527 
nations. Studies have found evidence for content biases using traditional, pre-industrial 528 
folklore such as fairy tales (Barrett, Burdett, & Porter, 2009; Norenzayan et al., 2006) and, as 529 
discussed above, the oral narratives of foraging people can be seen to contain information 530 
relevant to survival and social interaction (Sugiyama, 2001). Some of the Setsuwa bungaku 531 
(tale literature) of Japan’s Kamakura period (1185-1333) frequently feature motifs related to 532 
survival information (i.e. food contamination stories or tales of unpleasant death) and social 533 
information (i.e. tales involving social interaction and social embarrassment) which bear 534 
striking similarities to contemporary, Western urban legends (Schaefer, 1990). Given the 535 
presence of biased content in this diverse, international range of folklore it is plausible to 536 
suggest that content biases (or some of them at least) are shared universally, however, the 537 
relative frequencies examined here may vary significantly. For instance, social information is 538 
likely to be particularly salient cross-culturally, as all humans live in social groups, but the 539 
frequency of survival information found in  stories may vary on how dangerous the 540 
ecological environment is, or how reliant on the local ecological environment one is for food. 541 
Examining how the relative frequency of content biases is reflected in folklore cross-542 
culturally presents an interesting avenue for future research and would go towards examining 543 




In sum, this study has found compelling evidence that the popularity and longevity of urban 548 
legends can be explained, at least in part, by cognitive  biases to learn and transmit certain 549 
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kinds of information content. We argue that, although it is likely that most of these 550 
dispositions were selected for in our evolutionary past, they make us susceptible to narratives 551 
that may have no adaptive value in themselves, such as urban legends (see Sperber, 1996). 552 
Evidence was found for all of the content biases which have been suggested by experimental 553 
research. The distributions of content biases suggest humans are especially susceptible to 554 
narratives containing social information. This finding supports the hypothesis that human 555 
cognition was shaped to a greater degree by selective pressures from the social environment 556 
than the natural environment. The results further suggest that combining biases together in a 557 
single narrative could confer a greater transmission advantage than a single bias alone, 558 
although further research needs to be conducted to examine how biases can combine and the 559 
effects of this on transmission. Last of all, I emphasise that in discussing ‘susceptibilities’ we 560 
eschew any pejorative implications associated with the term. Occasionally urban legends may 561 
be harmful, but on the whole they are entertaining and fun (as evidenced by the frequency of 562 
amusing themes). Sometimes they may even be therapeutic, providing ways of making sense 563 
of a frightening or unpredictable world.  Above all, urban legends are catchy, and by 564 
investigating the underlying psychological factors that make them so, we have demonstrated 565 
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